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1Introduction
Analysts of development have long discussed the proper role of the government in
promoting economic growth.  Although nuances differ, in general, two distinct
approaches have predominated, one emphasizing the role of the market, the other
emphasizing the role of the state in promoting development.  The Market Friendly
View (World Bank, 1993) presumes that – in the absence of inefficient government
intervention – the market generally functions efficiently, and so the government should
act to ensure secure property rights and competition, but otherwise not interfere in
economic activity.  In contrast, the Developmental State View (Johnson, 1982,
Amsden, 1989, Wade, 1990) presumes that market failure is pervasive and thus
government intervention is necessary to mobilize savings, allocate resources efficiently
and promote technological catch-up.
A central role of an economic system (including both the private and public sectors) is
to coordinate economic activity across the various agents in the economy.  The two
views stress a different primary locus of coordination in the economy.  The Market
Friendly View emphasizes the role of the market, whereas the Development State View
emphasizes the role of the government.  These two views inherently consider the roles
of the market and the state as substitutes; either decision making and coordination is
decentralized and carried out through market transactions or coordination is performed
by a centralized agent – the state – or at least the state intervenes actively to alter what
the market itself would do.
This paper continues in the tradition of a third view – the Market Enhancing View
(Aoki, et al., 1997, Council of Economic Advisers 1997) – which instead suggests that
the proper role of the state is to engage in activities which complement the market.
This view presumes that most economic activity should be performed by decentralized
agents engaged in market transactions, but it also recognizes that market failures are
much more pervasive than is implicitly recognized by the Market Friendly View.  The
2fundamental tenet is that government can take actions that improve the efficiency of
decentralized markets.
Examples of the kinds of activity envisioned by the Market Enhancing View include
promoting joint research activity, government-business deliberation councils, standards
setting, market promotion, prudential regulation, etc. A common element of these
diverse policies is that the ultimate locus of control of economic activity remains in the
private sector, not in the government. The role of the government is to facilitate a more
efficient functioning of private markets.  This stands in marked contrast to both the
Market Friendly View, which envisions a minimalist government, and the
Developmental State View which gives the government the explicit responsibility for
resource allocation decisions.1
In this paper we apply the Market Enhancing View of government to the financial
system.  We describe a set of polices that we have called financial restraint in our
previous work (Stiglitz, 1993ab, Hellmann et al., 1994,  1996, 1997ab) and show how
these policies embody the principles of the Market Enhancing View.  The paper
therefore has two objectives.  First, it attempts to show how the principles of the Market
Enhancing View can be applied to financial markets.  Second, it explains how our
previous work on financial restraint implicitly takes the Market Enhancing View of
government policy.
We begin by analyzing the nature of financial transactions to understand why purely
decentralized financial markets will, in general, fail to yield an efficient allocation of
resources.  Essentially, all financial transactions involve the exchange of a real good for
a promise of repayment in the future.  If agents financial intermediaries in particular-
cannot make credible promises of future repayment then there will be too little financial
intermediation.  Those resources that are intermediated by the financial sector may be
misallocated.  When a bank with little stake in the future captures deposits, it has
3incentives to engage in “gambling” or “looting” activities.  A bank can gamble by
investing in projects that are excessively risky or poorly diversified.  If the projects
succeed, the bank wins; if they fail, the depositors (or the government) bear the loss (cf.
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, Kane, 1989).  Akerlof and Romer (1993) also explain how
banks engage in directly fraudulent activities that they call looting.  Bank managers
invest in projects that allow them to extract money for their private use at the expense
of the bank that will be driven deliberately into bankruptcy.2
The purpose of financial restraint, then, is to promote the creation of a large number of
decentralized agents that can make credible promises of future repayment,  and thus
will not engage in gambling or looting behavior. This is achieved by a set of policies
designed to create “franchise value” (Caprio and Summers, 1995), i.e., a flow of
economic rents that the bank can only capture through its continued viable operation.3
Franchise value induces banks to become long-term players that have incentives to keep
their promises, and particularly not to defraud depositors by gambling or looting.
A related issue for the financial sector in developing economies is the process of
deposit mobilization.  In a competitive market, banks may have too few incentives to
develop deposit taking infrastructure in rural areas.  This problem arises because it is
                                                                                                                                              
1
   The interventions contemplated here go well beyond the Pigouvian taxes for correcting externalities;
they affect in fundamental ways how markets function.
2
   Underlying both are information asymmetries:  depositors (and sometimes regulators) cannot
distinguish the riskiness of bank portfolios, or even in many cases, the presence of looting activity.
3
   Assume some set of policies have been put in place that allow the bank to capture an economic rent
each period it effectively manages its portfolio (and consequently, the bank does not go bankrupt).  As
long as the bank continues viable operation, it will continue to capture this rent.  While the per period
value of the rent may be small, the capitalized value of the rent will be much larger.  It is this capitalized
value that Caprio and Summers refer to as “franchise value.”  Critically, the franchise value is predicated
upon future earnings and cannot be looted in the present.
Franchise value is simply the analog in these markets of ‘reputation rents’ which have been
studied extensively elsewhere as the basis of ensuring good behavior in the presence of moral hazard or
contract enforcement problems (Klein and Leffler (1981), Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Shapiro (1981),
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)).  A distinguishing feature between these models and the theory of financial
restraint is that in these earlier models markets themselves create the rents by restricting entry.  The
distinguishing information assumption is that, for example in product markets, the marginal cost of
production is known; customers infer that if the price is too close to the cost of production this producer
will have an incentive to cheat.  In financial markets the relevant components of marginal cost and profit
are likely to be unobservable.
4costly to open branches in undeveloped areas.  Prior to entry, the may exist uncertainty
as to the ex post profitability of opening a branch.  After entry, successful branches
soon face competition, whereas the bank alone bears the cost of a failed branch.  In
essence, the bank creates a public good (regarding the value of opening a branch) when
it enters.  Another goal of financial restraint is to create rent opportunities so that banks
have efficient incentive to invest in deposit mobilization.
There are two key policies necessary to implement financial restraint – deposit rate
ceilings and entry restrictions.  It is important to note that the magnitude of each of
these interventions must be modest.  The deposit rate ceiling must be set high enough to
provide a positive real rate of return for depositors.  And the number of banks must be
large enough to foster some competition between banks, yet remain small enough that
the banks preserve some of the rents created by the deposit rate ceiling.
When these two interventions are implemented effectively, banks earn rents on the
deposits they hold this period and each period into the future, creating the franchise
value necessary to produce long run incentives for the bank.  Furthermore, by creating a
sufficient number of these agents, the resource allocation process becomes a
decentralized one where firms have many banks from which to seek financing.
Of course, the government could create franchise value simply by providing a subsidy
to well-behaved banks.  This is the traditional neoclassical prescription of using taxes
and subsidies as opposed to price or quantity controls.  If the “optimal” tax-and-subsidy
mechanism could be costlessly implemented, it would be at least as efficient as
financial restraint.4  Unfortunately, there are numerous reasons why this is not possible,
such as the information requirements needed by the government agent and the incentive
problems faced by government bureaucrats with discretionary control over the
subsidies.  Worse, this mechanism represents a significant centralization of resource
allocation in the economy because the government’s discretionary control over the flow
5of subsidies invariably would lead to increased influence and control by the government
over investment decisions.
The policy analysis of this paper was developed by examining the policies actually
practiced by a number of governments throughout East Asia, and most notably Japan.
Since World War II, the Japanese financial system has experienced tremendous success
(during the high growth period), while it currently is suffering significant distress.  The
ideas outlined in this paper can explain both phenomenon.  During the high growth
period, the Japanese government effectively practiced financial restraint, but the
government mismanaged the transition away from financial restraint, failing to replace
these policies with an effective alternate form of prudential regulation.  Examples of
how these policies were actually implemented in Japan and elsewhere in East Asia are
developed at the end of the paper.
In the remainder of the paper, we develop these ideas more thoroughly.  Section 1
discusses the fundamental challenge to financial policy – why a purely decentralized
market for financial intermediation may lead to too little investment in deposit
mobilization, an inefficient allocation of resources, and insufficient incentives to
monitor firms.  Section 2 explains the policies of financial restraint and how they serve
to create a better alignment between private incentives and social incentives.  A
comparison between financial restraint and more traditional government intervention is
presented in Section 3.  Finally, Section 4 presents examples of actual policies that were
practiced by East Asian governments.  A brief conclusion follows
Section 1:  The “free market” in financial intermediation
Financial intermediaries serve a number of functions in the investment process in an
economy.  Herein we emphasize three roles that are most central in this process –
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   More fundamentally, if the government could observe “good behavior” so it could encourage it by
6mobilization of savings, allocation of investment, and monitoring the performance of
borrowers.  In an efficiently functioning market for financial intermediation, banks
should have appropriate incentives to invest in undertaking these activities.  We argue,
however, that there are numerous impediments to creating these appropriate incentives,
and that they are most severe when an economy is in a low state of financial
development.
Let us begin by examining the process of deposit mobilization.  In rural areas, where no
banking infrastructure exists, those with savings are required to self-intermediate, either
by using hard goods (such as land, grain, cattle, precious metals, etc.) as a store of value
or by lending savings to another through informal market activity.5  Some of this “self-
intermediation” activity, of course, is efficient.6  Rural cooperatives, personal lending
based on family ties, and other forms of credit institutions that utilize the information
and relationships already established in rural areas may achieve a high risk-adjusted
return on a fraction of their activity.7  Our point is that there also exist large numbers of
savers who earn a lower risk-adjusted return through these informal market activities
than they could if they had access to the formal financial sector.  For these savers who
could earn a higher (risk adjusted) return if they were to deposit their funds in a bank, it
is often the case that the transaction costs of traveling to the nearest major city (and the
                                                                                                                                              
subsidization, it could also – at less cost – simply disclose that information.
5
   See Hoff, Braverman and Stiglitz (1993) for a thorough discussion of these issues.
6
   Typically, though, there is restricted scope for (geographical) risk diversification.
7
   The idea that some economic activity can be more efficiently engaged in rural areas is part of a broader
theme of “rural-inclusive development” (see the chapter by Hayami in this book).  In contrast to a model
where development primarily occurs in urban areas and people must migrate from rural to urban locations
to participate, when there is parallel development in rural areas, some real efficiencies are achieved.
Fewer investments in infrastructure (such as housing for new urban residents) are needed to support the
same level of activity and, importantly, existing networks of relationships are not disrupted.  Thus, rural-
inclusive development has the dual advantages of reducing congestion externalities in urban areas while
preserving the information embodied in rural relationships.
In this context, one common criticism of financial restraint – that deposit rate controls distorts
investment allocation – has different implications.  Consider the case where the net effect of a modestly
binding deposit rate ceiling (reducing deposit rates from 5 percent to 3 percent in real terms) is that some
marginal investment flows through the informal financial sector.  This will support an expansion of
relatively efficient economic activity in the rural sector (those that yield a net return to savers of between
3 and 5 percent).  This activity will reduce congestion costs in urban areas and reduce the need for
duplicative investment (i.e. housing).  The net effect could be positive.
7potential risk of theft on the way) to deposit and reclaim their funds creates a sufficient
barrier that they do not do so.
Secondly, even when informal market activity can be used to finance efficiently a set of
economic activities, the scale of projects that can be financed through this mechanism is
limited by the very nature of the activity.  To the extent that there are large scale
investment activities that require agglomeration of capital, finance through the formal
sector is required.
Essentially, there is a “missing market” in financial intermediation and this missing
market results in an inefficient allocation of investment.  Our claim is that, particularly
in rural areas and small population centers, there is too little investment in deposit
mobilization infrastructure when there is a “free market” in financial intermediation.
There are markets that could be efficiently served, but that perfectly competitive private
banks have insufficient incentives to invest in that service.
Our idea (which is developed formally in Hellmann, et al., 1996) is that the potential
return to investing in a rural market depends partly on aspects of the market that are not
observable until after entry.  Once any one bank has entered, however, then this
information becomes observable to potential competitors.  Thus, if a bank enters an
attractive market, it will soon face competition, eroding any rents, whereas if it
mistakenly enters a poor market, it will bear the costs of entry alone.8  Entering rural
markets provides a public good – information about the quality of the market – that
private banks have too little incentive to provide relative to the socially efficient level.
Furthermore, even in markets where entry has occurred, there can be too little
investment in deepening the market.  If only a fraction of the local populace currently
utilizes the banking system, perhaps because the savers bear a fixed cost of converting
their savings into liquid assets, banks could make investments to help these savers
8convert to financial intermediation.  In a competitive market, however, banks will earn
no rents on their marginal depositors.  As a consequence, they will make no fixed
investments to deepen their deposit base.
For both of the above two reasons, a competitive market for financial intermediation
results in providing banks too little incentives to invest in financial deepening.  While
these issues are not severe in a highly developed economy, where most savers have
access to financial intermediation, these issues can be severe in a less developed
economy.
We now turn to the second major function of financial intermediation – the allocation
of investment.  Ideally, banks should consider themselves as long run agents and have
the proper incentives to invest in screening borrowers to select projects with the highest
expected return.  The concern we raise is that banks frequently do not have the proper
incentives and can instead earn a higher return by investing in risky projects, with
depositors (or the government in the case of deposit insurance) bearing the downside
risk.
Experience over the last decade and a half bears out this concern.  The banking crises in
the United States, Japan and Mexico are now well known, but systemic financial crises
are much more widespread. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) identify over 60 countries
which experienced a systemic banking crisis in the last two decades.  They show that
financial crises occur partly as a product of unexpected shocks to the macro economy.
But they provide ample evidence that these macro shocks only uncover banking
structures already weakened by moral hazard activities of at least some of the banks.
Since any banking system has to deal with macro economic shocks, it is important to
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   This is a general problem, but its consequences may be particularly severe in financial markets.  See
Hoff and Stiglitz (1993).
9understand and address the fragility of the financial system by examining how the
incentives of banks become misaligned.9
In our previous work (Hellmann et al., 1994, 1996, 1997ab) we have examined in great
detail the incentives of banks to engage in prudent versus imprudent (gambling and
looting) behavior.  A bank choosing the “prudent” strategy has an expected stream of
future income from this strategy – this is its franchise value.  Were the bank to gamble
instead, it enjoys the prospect of higher returns should the gamble succeed.  Should it
fail, however, the bank loses its own capital plus its claim of future returns it could have
captured had it followed the “prudent” strategy.  It is immediately evident, then, that the
greater is the bank’s own equity and the greater is its franchise value, the lower is the
bank’s incentive to gamble.10
Excessive competition has a deleterious effect on the bank’s franchise value.  As the
intensity of competition increases, the rents captured by each bank falls.  In most
markets, the effects of competition increase allocational efficiency as the price
approaches the marginal cost of production.  This is not necessarily the case in the
market for financial intermediation.  As competition drives down the bank’s rents, at
some point the bank’s franchise value is diminished sufficiently that it does not mind
risking that franchise value by gambling with depositors’ funds.  This is best seen in the
limiting case of a bank with no franchise value:  the bank places no value on continuing
operation in the future.  Once confronted with a gambling or looting opportunity, this
bank will always take it, because it captures all of the upside while bearing none of the
downside loss.  Depositors, with imperfect ability to monitor banks, will place their
funds in those banks and suffer losses.11
                                                
9
   The distinction is somewhat stylized:  the point is that private incentives lead to excessive risk taking –
given that their private incentives do not internalize social cost.
10
  The same reasoning applies to the case of looting.
11
  In Hellmann et. al. (1994) we also discuss why capital requirements should not be expected to solve
completely the problem of rogue banking.
10
We consider the third major function of financial intermediation – monitoring the
performance of borrowers.  To monitor borrowers properly, banks need to make
specific investments in the relationship with the borrower.  The private return on the
investment depends on the longevity of the relationship between borrower and lender.
As noted above, banks may have inefficient incentives to engage in risky lending that
increases the risk of bank failure.  This has a deleterious effect on the bank’s incentives
to make specific investments in its client borrowers.
In a related manner, the bank only internalizes the value of these specific investments to
the extent to which they increase the value of its equity (and not the increased return
this may cause for depositors due to lower risk of default).  This is another way of
expressing that banks have too little incentive to invest in monitoring borrowers.
More subtle, however, is the effect that this may have on the ability of the banking
system to develop an institutional mechanism that enhances the governance of financial
intermediation, such as the main bank system in Japan.  These informal, institutional
mechanisms require investments by both banks and firms and which are complements
to investments in firm specific knowledge.  Thus, the erosion of incentives to invest in
specific knowledge also harms the financial sector’s ability to develop these
complementary institutions.  Related to this effect, the extent to which banks invest in
gathering specific firm knowledge may alter the technology choice of the firms.  (See
Dinc (1997).)  The essential idea is that firms can invest in more complex technology
when banks invest in firm specific knowledge because it enhances the bank’s credibility
to intervene appropriately should the firm experience distress.
Two key features are complementary to the development of these monitoring
institutions – the investment by banks in firm specific knowledge and the ability to
capture rents in the financial sector.  When governments practice a laissez-faire policy,
the extent of competition reduces the incentives of banks to make these investments
while at the same time competing away rents from the financial sector.
11
Finally, when we consider that the nature of competitive interaction can probably be
characterized as monopolistic competition, it is likely that in a laissez-faire marketplace
there will be both excessive entry and too large an incentive to raise deposit rates.  This
is due to the “market-stealing” effect.  Banks do not internalize the adverse effects of
their actions on other banks when making strategic decisions.  Mankiw and Whinston
(1986) show that, for homogeneous goods markets this business-stealing effect results
in excess entry.12  Similarly, a like effect applies in setting deposit rates, both because
banks do not internalize the adverse impact of profits of other banks and because banks
do not internalize the impact on raising deposit rates on the fragility of the banking
system.
Section 2: Market enhancing through financial restraint
The purpose of the preceding section was to demonstrate the impact of a government
practicing laissez faire policies with respect to the financial sector, particularly when
the economy is in a low state of financial development.  In order for the banking sector
to function efficiently, banks must make a number of different kinds of investments – in
deposit mobilization infrastructure, in selecting efficient investment projects, in firm
specific knowledge regarding borrowers – but the incentives to make these investments
depend on the ability of the bank to capture rents.  The laissez faire competitive
equilibrium has too little rents for three main reasons:  1)  When banks fail, they impose
costs on depositors and so banks do not internalize the benefits to depositors when
making private investment decisions; 2) some of the investments create information
that is partly a public good, so the banks do not capture the full value of their
investment; and 3) under conditions of monopolistic competition, there can be both
excessive incentives for entry and to compete for deposits by raising deposit rates due
to the “business-stealing” effect.
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   They also show that, if consumers have preferences for product variety, there may be too little
incentive for entry.  We believe, however, that the former result is more applicable in the case of deposit
markets.
12
The preceding arguments do not imply a radical departure from free market banking –
such as having government owned banks with the government ultimately responsible
for the mobilization and allocation of funds.  As mentioned in the introduction, this is
the response proposed by those favoring the Developmental State View of government
– a view which we believe does not adequately consider the limitations of government
action.
Instead, we favor the Market Enhancing View, which primarily emphasizes the
importance of decentralized agents processing locally available information.  Where
this view differs from the Market Friendly View is really a difference in emphasis – we
argue that market failures are more common than is implicitly assumed in the Market
Friendly View and that there are government policies that can effectively address these
failures.
In particular, we show in this section how two policy instruments – deposit rate ceilings
and limitations on entry – can promote a more efficient equilibrium in the private
sector.  These policies seem counterintuitive, at first.  How can government acting to
restrict competition promote efficient market-based outcomes?
Essentially, unrestrained competition inhibits the capture of the rents necessary to
justify making investments are that are socially efficient.  By practicing financial
restraint, the government creates a competitive environment that retains most of the
benefits of a decentralized system of financial allocation, while also creating the
positive incentives to invest in activities that are underprovided in a laissez faire
competitive market.
Even though some restrictions on entry are necessary to ensure that banks capture rents,
it is not the objective of financial restraint to have a small number of banks.  Rather, a
sufficiently large number of banks should be allowed to enter such that there exists
13
some competitive pressure in the lending market, so firms have alternative sources from
which to seek funds.  There is value in having more than one agent with the ability to
process locally available information about the quality of the managers of individuals
firms and the likely prospects of investment projects.  With more information
processing nodes, the quality of projects ultimately financed by the financial sector
should improve.  As Sah and Stiglitz (1986) have shown, when the decision making
process for whether to proceed with a project is decentralized, there is a bias towards
approving projects whereas in a hierarchy, there is a bias to reject projects.13  Sah and
Stiglitz establish conditions (e.g. where the cost of rejecting good projects is greater
than the cost of approving bad ones) under which the decentralized mechanism is
preferred.  More broadly, they argue that some degree of decentralization is preferred to
a single hierarchy.  Thus, too few banks in the financial system may be harmful.  Given
that we have already argued that excessive competition is also harmful, we conclude
that an intermediate level of competition is optimal.14
Next we consider how financial restraint can affect the incentives to mobilize deposits.
As discussed in Section 1, the reason why banks have too little incentive to develop
rural and small population center markets is because the act of entry creates public
information about the quality of the market.  Producing this public good is costly,
because if the market is attractive, competing banks enter and reduce the returns to the
first bank.
If the first bank, however, received what amounts to “patent protection” for providing
this public good, then banks would have a countervailing incentive that rewards entry
into underdeveloped markets.  If the government does not allow immediate competitive
entry after a bank enters a new market, then the first mover would be able to capture
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   That is, under decentralization, the probability of a bad project being accepted is higher than under
hierarchy, while under hierarchy, the probability of a good project being rejected is higher.
14
  Moreover, as in any monopoly, lending rates will be high, discouraging socially profitable investment
from being undertaken.  To the extent that banks’ information gathering activities produce highly
correlated information competition for lending to any particular customer may be limited (see Jaffee and
Stiglitz, 1990).  In that case free entry dissipates profits through competition for deposits - with all of the
adverse effects noted earlier - without the positive effects of competition in lending activities.
14
rents before competition ensues.  When there are a number of markets not presently
served by any bank, this is a welfare enhancing policy.15  Consumers are better off
having one bank (even one capturing temporary monopoly rents) than having none at
all.  Banks will only enter if expected profits are positive, and firms benefit from an
increase in the amount of savings that are available to finance investment.
Similarly, even in markets that have a banking infrastructure, if a sizable fraction of
savers do not make deposits (and hence are disconnected from the financial sector)
financial restraint creates incentives for banks to make investments to deepen the
penetration of the banking sector.  With deposit rate ceilings, banks earn rents even on
their marginal depositor.  Thus, they will now create incentives to bring new depositors
into the system.16
With financial restraint banks have the opportunity to earn rents on an ongoing basis,
creating a franchise value for the bank.  It is useful to get an understanding of the
magnitudes involved.  Consider a stylized model of the financial market where there is
perfectly elastic demand for capital, earning a 5 percent return.  Let us assume that a
bank in this economy is capitalized with 10 percent equity and 90 percent deposits.  As
Table 1 shows, in a free market equilibrium without risk aversion, both deposits and
equity will earn a 5 percent return.
Now consider what happens if the government intervenes in the deposit market by
placing a 3 percent ceiling on deposit rates.  Depositors suffer a modest loss of income,
with their rate of return falling from 5 percent to 3 percent.  The return on equity,
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   A related issue is what is the optimal length of “patent protection” for banks that open up new markets.
Clearly, as the length of the patent increases there are countervailing effects – the bank’s incentive to enter
a market is rising, but consumers receive lower returns on their deposits.  An optimal policy must trade-
off these two effects.
16
 Of course, it is important to note that the efficiency of these kinds of investments depends crucially on
the state of financial deepening of the economy.  When the exists substantial opportunities to bring new
depositors into the financial sector, these investments have a positive social payoff by increasing the
average return on investment in the economy (as depositors shift from self-intermediation to financial
intermediation).  Once most depositors already have access (i.e. have opened a savings account), then
investments to recruit depositors from other savings institutions are dissipative and inefficient.
15
however, increases dramatically, from 5 percent to 23 percent!  the owners of this bank
now earn a net return of $2.3 each period.  The capitalized value is this income stream is
$46: this is the franchise value of the bank.
Table 1:           Franchise Value of a Bank
Free Market Financial restraint
Amount Gross Rate of Amount Gross Rate of
Invested Return Return Invested Return Return
Assets $100 $105 5% $100 $105 5%
Deposits $90 $94.5 5% $90 $92.7 3%
Equity $10 $10.5 5% $10 $12.3 23%
Franchise Value Franchise Value
of Equity => $0.5/(5%)=$10 of Equity => $2.3/(5%) = $46
This franchise value significantly alters the relative return to gambling versus prudent
loan portfolios.  When investing $100 of capital, the owners act as if they have $46 at
stake. Gambling only has a higher private return for the equity holders if the loss in a
bad state exceeds the value of the equity they invested; otherwise they bear all of the
downside risk.  If the owner were confronted with a fair gamble he would only take it if
he could win or loose more than 46 percent of the bank’s assets.  Similarly, he would
only loot the bank if he could take out more than 46% of its assets.  Both of these events
are so extreme that under most plausible scenarios the owners prefer to invest the bank’s
assets prudently.
More generally this example shows that if the franchise value is sufficiently large, then
banks have no incentive to gamble because the loss of future rents is greater than any
short term gains from gambling.  As a consequence, the incentives of banks are aligned
with a more socially optimal incentive structure.  This improves the efficiency of
investment projects funded by the financial sector.
16
Finally, we consider the effect of financial restraint on lending rates, amounts and its
role in promoting more effective bank monitoring of firms.  The effect of deposit rate
control on lending amounts and rates is fairly complex.  Neo-classical analysis
suggested that with a downward sloping demand curve and an upward sloping supply
curve a deposit rate ceiling would reduce the amount of savings and thus increase the
lending rates. 17  We have already discussed why the problem of disintermediation on an
upward sloping supply is easily overstated and why financial restraint may actually
increase the amount of savings mobilized.
The other question thus concerns the effects on the market for loans.  An important
feature not acknowledged in the neo-classical framework is credit rationing (see Jaffee
and Stiglitz 1990 for a survey).  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that in the presence of
adverse selection and moral hazard problems, lending rates may be insensitive to
changed in the supply of fund.  Moreover, an argument can be made that financial
restraint is likely to increase the efficiency of the lending market by improving the
quality of lending transactions.  In particular, because of the rent opportunities and
because of the incentive to be long-term agents, banks may have strong incentives to
invest in monitoring capabilities.  With better information, banks can alleviate some of
the inefficiencies associated with credit rationing.  This will translate into lower lending
rates to some but not all firms - lower quality firms now have to pay a higher interest
rate commensurate to their risk.  The overall effect, however, is to increase the
efficiency of the lending market.
With respect to banks’ monitoring of firms, it should be readily apparent that the
creation of franchise value supports bank managers acting as long run agents.  When
banks have substantial franchise value, they bear most of the risk of their decisions.
Thus, they have appropriate incentives to make investments in specific knowledge
about their borrowers.
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 Hoff and Stiglitz (1993) also discuss some departures from the neo-classical lending market equilibria
for developing markets.  They emphasize that substitution patterns between the formal and the informal
sector may cause lending rates to be insensitive to changes in loan supply.
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As noted in Section 1, there are also additional positive incentives that support the
creation of institutional monitoring mechanisms.  Investments in these governance
structures are complementary to investment in firm specific knowledge and can more
easily be supported when the banks capture rents from their activities.  Thus, the main
policies of financial restraint, while not directly affecting the creation of these
mechanisms, do create an environment conducive to their emergence by increasing
incentives for complementary investments.
It is worth noting, however, that the implementation of financial restraint does require
that the government place limitations on entry of new banks and on the opening of new
branches by existing banks.  While these limitations could be implemented simply by
charging high entry fees, in practice they are implemented through discretionary
controls.  Anytime a government agent is given discretion, there exists some potential
for abuse, but it also creates an opportunity.  If these discretionary rents are used to
reward banks that are effective monitors of their client portfolio, then these policies can
also serve to promote the development of institutional monitoring mechanisms.  Some
examples of how the policies of East Asian governments served these objectives are
described in further detail in Section 4 below.
Section 3:  Rent opportunities versus subsidies
An important objective of the policy of financial restraint is to create franchise value
for banks.  If that is the case, why use deposit rate controls and entry restrictions to
create franchise value, rather than giving subsidies to banks?  Neo-classical economists
by and large believe that if governments intervene they should use taxes and subsidies
rather than price and quantity controls.  In models that assume only minor departures
from the perfect market assumptions, such policies are sometimes indeed shown to be
superior.  In our context, a ‘tax-and-subsidize-approach’ would entail the government
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imposing a tax on deposits and distributing the revenues to banks.  (In fact, the
government need not rely on taxing deposits, but instead it can devise optimal taxes on
a broad set of economic activities, and then use these tax proceeds to subsidize banks.)
We argue a tax-and-subsidize approach is not superior to financial restraint because it
induces entirely different behavior by the agents in the system.
To understand the difference between financial restraint and a tax-and-subsidize
approach we need to emphasize the difference between rent opportunities and subsidies.
Unlike a subsidy, a rent opportunity does not guarantee the receipt of profit, but it only
provides a chance at making profit.  Whether an agent takes advantage of this chance
depends entirely on its own actions.  While the formalizations of neo-classical theory
emphasize the price-setting functions of markets, the Austrian school always
emphasizes the “entrepreneurial” aspect of a market system, where decentralized agents
pursue profit opportunities through economic activity.  It is this entrepreneurial role of
markets upon which financial restraint builds.  If the agent performs well, it will make a
high profit, but it if performs poorly, then no subsidy will bail it out.  The important
property of financial restraint is that it provides contingent rents: a bank can only make
profits if it engages in activities that create profits.18
Another reason that financial restraint is preferred relates to the difference between a
self-selection and a screening mechanism.  In order to implement a policy objective the
government can choose among alternative systems that vary in their degree of
centralization of control and information processing.  In a tax and subsidize system the
government needs to spend considerable resources on screening applicants.19  For this it
must have a fairly centralized approach of evaluating past performance and future plans
of it applicants, banks in our case.  With financial restraint, however, the government
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   In principle,  the government could subsidize only successful firms, e.g. the larger the profit, the
greater the subsidy.  But this would require that the government observing economic (as opposed to
accounting) profits.  With financial restraint, the government requires far less information.
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   That is, since the purpose of the exercise is to create an enterprise with positive (franchise) value, there
will be an excess supply of applicants.  Less efficient firms – for whom the subsidy will not ensure good
behavior – still desire to enter.
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relies more on a self-selection mechanism. Only those agents that are able to perform in
a contingent rent environment will choose to seek bank charters.  Agents use their own
information in choosing to seek bank charters. The government’s burden to evaluate
those agents is somewhat lower.20  Reliance on a self-selection mechanism such as
financial restraint is particularly valuable if a government has relatively poor
information or information processing capabilities.
One objection to the above argument is that it assumes a ‘conventional’ implementation
of government subsidies that is not contingent on performance.  Laffont and Tirole
(1993) summarize the extensive literature on the optimal policy design of government
regulation and procurement.  A general result of this literature is that the payoff to the
firm should be positively correlated with the firm’s performance.  Financial restraint
precisely satisfies this condition, since banks are residual claimants on rents.
This literature suggests that a system of subsidies, where the government commits to an
optimally chosen contingent subsidy structure, is an alternative to financial restraint
and preferable because it entails open subsidies rather than the hidden ones implicit in
financial restraint.  We disagree with this conclusion because it rests on assumptions
that we believe are not justifiable in the context of financial market regulation.
Examining these assumptions helps us to understand some of the fundamental
properties of financial restraint.
Second, the incentives and the opportunities for the government may differ.  In the
optimal regulation framework the government can make verifiable transfers to the
agents - in our case the bank - at no cost.  This assumes that the government agency in
charge of the subsidies can be trusted to implement such a policy honestly and
efficiently. In an “optimal subsidy” scheme, the government would raise revenues
through an optimal tax structure and then provide the appropriate contingent subsidies
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 The extent to which this is true depends on assumptions concerning how firms differ.  In some cases
financial restraint may fully resolve the selection problem, in others it may differ little from the case of
subsidies.
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to the banks.  Thus, the flow of funds courses from households to the government and
then to the banks.  While this literature focuses on the problems that a government has
in collecting information from and enforcing contracts in the private sector, it does not
address the problem that there may be similar problems with respect to the
government’s own actions.  But precisely because tax revenue is at one stage controlled
by the government, there are significant political economy questions about whether the
government can credibly commit to deploying those funds as determined by the optimal
contingent subsidy scheme.  Even if that were the government’s objective, agents within
the bureaucracy are vulnerable to corruption, particularly if their discretionary control is
substantial.
A fundamental strength of financial restraint is that the government does not directly
interfere in the flow of funds from depositors to firms.  The government only creates the
rent opportunities, by placing a modestly binding deposit rate ceiling.  Depositors are
therefore “taxed” by the amount by which the rate ceiling is binding, with 100 percent
of the revenue from this tax captured by the bank.  This provides fewer opportunities for
government officials to divert funds to alternative uses.  There is less scope for
corruption, as government officials are not controlling the resources themselves.  And
the government does not need to have as much information about the individual
performance of each bank.21
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  This argument may overstate the difference (in their propensity to generate corruption) between
financial restraint and the optimal subsidy scheme.  Under financial restraint, there will presumably be
excess applicants for entry, who then may compete to capture an entry franchise by paying bribes to the
government bureaucrat.  Interestingly, however, bribes to receive the entry franchise do not adversely
affect bank behavior (and thus does not affect efficiency), provided that the bribe is a sunk cost after the
bank has gained the entry franchise – it is the on-going value of the bank that provides the bank’s
incentives.  If the government official takes an ‘equity’ position in the bank - that is his payoff depends on
the bank’s performance - he has improved incentives to select well, but the bank has reduced incentives to
perform well.
The essential argument for financial restraint present herein is that the scope for corruption may
be reduced when the government is not directly involved in the flow of funds.  On the other hand, in
principle, an explicitly defined, transparent, and accountable contingent scheme (in which potential
entrants pay the government an up-front fee in return for a contingent reward) might reduce the role for
government discretion and corruption, and improve self-selection without adversely affecting
performance.
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Recognizing the difference between financial restraint and subsidies also helps us to
understand more precisely the difference between financial restraint and financial
repression.  First and foremost, there is a substantial difference in the magnitude of the
intervention implied by these two policy regimes.  Financial restraint presumes a stable
macro-economic environment and low inflation.  In contrast, financial repression is
usually associated with high inflation which, in combination with binding nominal
deposit rate ceilings, yields low very negative real interest rates.
Financial restraint takes the Market Enhancing View of government, whereas financial
repression is more closely associated with the Developmental State View.  In financial
repression the government typically owns banks.  It becomes responsible for the
mobilization of deposits, and it takes a direct role in the allocation of funds, such as
through directed credit programs and loans to public enterprises.  Financial repression is
thus more akin to the tax-and-subsidize approach, although it goes further. Under
financial repression the government actively gets involved in the allocation of resources,
through its directed credit programs and possibly loans to state-owned enterprises. As a
consequence, financial repression is often associated with a centralized mechanism of
credit allocation.  As we have argued above, such a system makes poor use of
decentralized information.  But since the government is involved in the flow of funds,
financial repression provides opportunities for government officials to divert funds to
their private use or their political constituents.  And precisely because the government is
involved in the flow of funds, financial repression is associated with predatory
government behavior.  If the government uses the financial sector to raise revenues for
its own needs, banks cannot obtain rents from establishing reputations, making sound
investments or improving the financial infrastructure.22 As a consequence we conclude
that financial repression produces a net flow of rents from the private sector to the
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 Moreover, if the government uses the funds for its own consumption the production sector is also
deprived of funds.
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government, while financial restraint produces the creation of rent opportunities within
the private sector.23
Section 4:  Policy Examples from East Asia
In this section we show how the framework of financial restraint can be applied to
understand some of the specific features of East Asian financial development.  We will
argue that although there are significant differences between them, the East Asian
economies Japan, Korea and Taiwan practiced policies that broadly conform with the
notions of financial restraint.
One notable characteristic of these high growth economies is the high saving rates.  It
may be surprising then to recognize that all of these economies implemented deposit
rate controls.  The literature on financial repression (McKinnon, 1974) emphasized the
negative effect on saving of such controls.  This is indeed easy to observe and
understand when real deposit rates are significantly negative.  But in East Asia deposit
rates were, in general, positive in real terms.  It seems that the sensitivity of savings to
small changes in the deposit rate when rates are positive is relatively small.  In their
concluding chapter on financial development in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, Park and
Patrick (1994, p. 336) note that “the empirical evidence on the elasticity of saving to
real interest rates is mixed and unclear.  In none of the three countries is there strong
evidence of any significant effect of interest rates on savings behavior.”
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 Because the government is not involved in the actual flow of funds, financial restraint does not by itself
increase the government revenues.  There may, however, be an indirect effect on the government’s cost of
financing its fiscal deficit. By lowering the deposit rate, the government may encourage asset substitution
into government bonds, i.e. it increases the demand for government bonds.  The government may use this
to increase its borrowing at the given interest rate and thus increase the amount of resources devoted to
the government. Alternatively, the government may already have well-defined fiscal needs.  In this case
the increased demand does not lead to an increase in bonds, but rather to a drop in the bond rate. This has
the advantage of lowering the government’s cost of debt servicing and the distorting impact of taxation.
Note that after World War II, the United States deliberately tried to keep its interest rates lower for this
reason.
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The development literature has traditionally focused on the adverse consequences of
deposit rate ceilings, but in this paper we emphasize their benefits (provided that rates
remain positive in real terms).  Indeed, all of these economies experienced rising rates
of savings while they engaged in the policy of deposit rate controls.  We believe that a
much more important influence was a change in the incentives of banks.  (A reinforcing
effect was that depositors care a great deal about the safety of their deposits, which was
enhanced by financial restraint, perhaps more than offsetting the effect of the lower
interest rate.)
During the postwar years, banks were engaged in a remarkable effort to collect domestic
savings.  In Taiwan the government’s encouragement to mobilize deposits was so
successful that became a net foreign lender by the end of the 60’s.  Apart from running
an extensive postal saving scheme and instructing the government-owned banks to
mobilize deposits, the government did not crack down on the informal sector – a sector
that further mobilized domestic savings, especially in rural areas (Adams, Chen and
Lamberte, 1993, Cho, 1990, Shea, 1994).24  In the case of Japan, the zeal of banks to
collect deposits seems to have been particularly high.  Kitagawa and Kurosawa (1994)
and Teranishi (1994) report that in order to physically collect deposits, Japanese banks
sent out employees to their clients’ offices and homes.
Apart from influencing deposit mobilization, deposit rate controls also affected the
prudential behavior of East Asian banks.  This affect can be most powerfully seen in the
case of Hong Kong and Japan, the two countries that have had a private banking system
throughout the post war period.  Of all the East Asian economies, the country with the
most liberal approach to financial regulation was undoubtedly Hong Kong.  And while
the government did not control deposit rates directly, it found it acceptable to let banks
collude in setting their deposit rates.  Lau (1997, p 50) notes that “… the Foreign
Exchange Banks Association, headed by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank…
functions as a deposit-rate-setting-cartel.”  The net effect of this collusion was that
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private banks in Hong Kong were able to capture rents on their deposits, thereby
creating a franchise value for banks.
In Japan, the government engaged in a number of policies designed to create and
maintain franchise value for banks.  Apart from deposit rate controls, the government
maintained strict control over the number of banks in the economy, which has remained
remarkably stable from the early 1950s to the present (Teranishi, 1994, p 85).  It also
limited access to alternative saving vehicles, and in particular retarded the development
of bond and equity markets (see Teranishi, 1994).  During the 1950s and 1960s, the
financial system grew at a fast and stable rate of 14.25% per year (in real terms).
Aoki (1988, p 136) shows how the first oil shock severely diminished the margins
between deposit and lending rates, which had been high and stable before.  After the
first oil shock the government policy gradually liberalized the financial market and,
from 1975 on, the government gradually abolished deposit rate controls.  Weisbrod, Lee
and Rojas-Suarez (1992) document the decline in the banks’ franchise value throughout
the 1980s.  They estimate that the return on capital of the city banks fell from over 26%
in 1974 to under 5% in 1990.  Kitagawa and Kurosawa (1994) furthermore show that
net interest income of the city banks fell throughout the 1980s.  Interestingly, net non-
interest income rose until 1988 and then fell again.  In the early 1990s, with the burst of
the bubble economy, dramatic losses suddenly became apparent in the balance sheets of
Japanese banks, leading to one of the biggest banking crises in history.
The current difficulties of the Japanese financial system are often broadly interpreted as
evidence against government intervention in the financial sector and, in particular, that
the deposit rate controls and restrictions on competition are adverse policies.  We would
argue, however, that these events can be interpreted within the framework of financial
restraint – that the financial sector functioned effectively while the government
                                                                                                                                              
24
 In Korea, similarly, managers within the government-owned banks were given strong incentives to
mobilize deposits (Cho and Hellmann, 1994).
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practiced these policies but unfortunately the government poorly managed the transition
to a more competitive environment.
Prior to the 1973 oil shock, Japan was practicing financial restraint, where banks faced
a stable number of competitors and deposit rates were controlled.  This system began to
unravel during the 1970s, as the expansion of government bonds increased the
substitutability between deposits and other financial assets.  The government began a
steady process of deregulating deposit rates.  In light of declining franchise value, banks
changed their loan portfolios, in particular by investing in high risk real estate.  The
decline in franchise value was not immediately evident, due to temporarily high profits
in non-interest related activities (which was derived from business activities that were
partly related to the real estate bubble).  With the bursting of the bubble, however, it
became apparent that financial liberalization had changed the true profitability of these
banks.25  In addition the pattern of loan losses strongly suggests some moral hazard on
behalf of the banks – i.e. that they responded to the newly competitive environment by
gambling with their banks’ assets.
We argue that the Japanese government did not err in establish a set of policies
consistent with financial restraint in the early post-war period.  Rather, those policies
contributed to Japan’s economic success during the high growth period.  Where the
Japanese government did err, however, was in not having a clear conceptual model and
instead relying solely on a series of  “pragmatic” steps to respond to issues as they
arose.  In response to the macroeconomic shocks of the 1970s, the Japanese government
gradually evolved its policies from a regime of financial restraint to a more competitive
regime.  This regime required a new basis of prudential regulation, in which we believe
capital requirements should play an important role (See Hellmann, et al 1994).  The
Japanese government erred by not increasing the capital requirements of the banks at the
same time as it was allowing more competition and thus reducing the franchise value of
the banks.  If the Japanese government had a clear conceptual model of what it was
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doing to achieve the goal of prudential regulation, these steps would have naturally
followed.
Apart from the effects on deposit mobilization and incentives for prudent bank
behavior, we argued that the government policies can have a significant effect on the
governance structures in the financial systems.  Taiwan provides a simple example of
how the government can influence the quality of financial transactions.  Wade (1990)
and Shea (1994) report that postdated checks were the most common financial
instrument of the informal sector in Taiwan.  The government, however, imposed
criminal (including jail sentences) and not just civil penalties for those who did not
honor their checks.  This created a powerful contracting instrument between parties in
the informal sector, as it allowed parties to make promises of repayment more credible.
This is clearly a policy in line with the objectives of the Market Enhancing View.  One
of the real hazards of lending relationships in the informal sector is the difficulty in
enforcing contracts and the lack of collateral.  This policy effectively addressed both
issues.
Another interesting instance where the government designed or improved the
governance in the financial system relates to the Korean design of preferential loan
programs.  Once a government decides to pursue an industrial policy with a directed
credit program, one of the key challenges of implementing such a program is to design
rules that efficiently allocate these preferential loans.  As the experience of many
developing countries has shown, such a process can  easily become fraught with
inefficiencies.  The Korean government developed a system where directed credits are
directly tied to export orientation and performance.  This provided an effective
governance structure as funds were allocated on the basis of a performance criterion that
is easily observable and difficult to manipulate.  Furthermore, as Cho (1997) discusses,
the continued access to these preferential interest rates was contingent upon continued
export growth.  This can be thought of as an alternative method of monitoring
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 Indeed, a study by Ueda, reported in the Economist (1994), suggests that the value of deposit rate
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borrowers – only those that continued to achieve above a high threshold were able to
continue to borrow funds.
The role of the government in creating efficient institutions is also visible in Japan,
where the government played a role in designing institutions that support the financial
markets.  A book by Aoki and Patrick (1994) describes the “Japanese Main Bank
System” as a complex system of economic relationships between Japanese firms, banks
and the government.  At the core of the system are long-term relationships between
firms and banks and among banks that allow for an efficient sharing of various
monitoring tasks and that provide strong governance control; these relationships occur
among private profit-oriented agents.  In a chapter of the book, Aoki (1994) then shows
how the government supported the economic relationships between these private sector
agents.  In particular, he shows how the relationships between a main bank and a firm
could potentially be disrupted if banks failed to live up to their promises to monitor the
performance of firms.  Put differently, there needs to be some monitoring of the monitor
– or incentives – for the monitor not to shirk.  Incentives depend on the rents obtained
from monitoring.  Aoki argues that the regulatory framework in Japan, particularly
deposit rate controls, entry restrictions and discretionary branch licensing, allowed the
government to influence the banks incentives and thereby sustain the Main Bank
equilibrium.
These examples thus show how governments in East Asia took policy actions that
enhanced the operations of the market, rather than just substituting for the market.  It
should, however, be remember that the type of actions and the extent of intervention
differed significantly across the East Asian economies and across time.  We therefore
emphasize that the Market Enhancing View and financial restraint provide a set of
principles for the government to enhance the effectiveness of a decentralized and
competitive financial market.  The implementation of these principles, however, needs
to be adapted to the particular set of institutions of the country.
                                                                                                                                              
controls, estimated at 650 billion Yen in 1980, had decreased to 70 billion in 1990 and vanished by 1994.
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Conclusion
In this paper we have shown how the Market Enhancing View can be applied to the
problem of financial market regulation.  Unlike the Market Friendly View, we take the
perspective that laissez faire competitive markets are not necessarily efficient.  We
focus on three central issues – deposit mobilization, resource allocation, and bank
monitoring of firms.  We find that banks have too little incentive to invest in deposit
mobilization because these investments create a public good – information about
attractive markets for subsequent entry.  Furthermore, we find that the moral hazard
problem in banking – where banks can impose losses on depositors and/or the
governments – results in banks having excessive incentives to gamble and loot.  Finally,
because banks can exploit these risks, they also have too little incentive to invest in
monitoring the borrowers of their funds.
Unlike the Developmental State View, however, we do not recommend that the
government take direct action in financial markets by creating a government run
financial sector.  Instead we show how a simple set of policies – namely deposit rate
controls and restrictions on entry into banking – create positive incentives that work
towards aligning private incentives of banks with socially efficient incentives.  Creating
temporary “patent protection” of newly entered markets induces banks to invest in
deposit taking infrastructure in rural areas.  The flow of rents from the above policies
creates franchise value that induces banks to refrain from moral hazard.  Once banks are
operating as long run agents, they have appropriate incentives to invest in firm specific
knowledge to enhance their monitoring of firms.
We explain how this set of policies represents the Market Enhancing View: these
policies use the entrepreneurial energy and informational efficiency of decentralized
markets; the government does not interfere with the actual allocation of resources, but
29
rather provides conditions under which private agents undertake socially beneficial
actions.  This, we argue, is fundamentally different from the more traditional view of a
government that uses taxes and subsidies to increase economic efficiency because our
view recognizes the limited capabilities of government to implement effectively
complicated policy mechanisms partly because of the limited information at its disposal.
Rather, financial restraint utilizes simple and relatively transparent policy rules (modest
deposit rate controls and restrictions on entry) to achieve policy objectives in the
financial sector.
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